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IN THE 
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No. 76-1701 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, Petitioner, 
v. 
HIRAM G. HILL, JR., ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER, DONALD 
S. COHEN, THE AUDUBON COUNCIL OF TENNESSEE, 
INC., THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEASTERN BIOLOGISTS, 
Respondents. 
MOTION OF PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION FOR 
LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITIONER 
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 42, Pacific Legal 
Foundation hereby respectfully moves the Court for 
leave to file its brief amicus curiae bound with this 
motion. 
The accompanying brief urges this Court to reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals in Hill v. Tennes-
see Valley Authority, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977) 
and to reinstate the decision of the District Court in 
Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 419 F. Supp. 753 
(E.D. Tenn. 1976). 
The Pacific Legal Foundation is a non-profit, tax 
exempt corporation organized and existing under the 
laws of California for the purpose of engaging in 
litigation in matters affecting the broad public inter-
2 
est. The Foundation has more than 20,000 con-
tributors, and supporters throughout the United 
States. Policy for the Foundation is set by a Board 
of Trustees composed of concerned citizens. After 
evaluating the decision of the Court of Appeals, the 
Board has determined that a substantial question 
affecting the public interest is involved and has ap-
proved the filing of a brief amicus curiae in this 
matter. 
The Pacific Legal Foundation strongly supports the 
development of sound policies for implementing the 
Endangered Species Act. The Foundation believes 
that the balancing of the equities approach applied 
by the District Court serves the public in the manner 
intended by Congress. 
The Foundation believes that the Endangered 
Species Act must be enforced in a manner which con-
siders not only biological factors but also social and 
economic concerns. The Foundation has devoted a 
substantial portion of its resources to assuring that 
such a policy is effectuated. In furtherance of this 
policy, the Foundation has brought suit in Pacific 
Legal Foundation v. Cecil Andrus, No. 77-1054 (E.D. 
Tenn., filed Nov. 15, 1977). Moreover, the Foundation 
has worked with numerous citizens' groups concerned 
about the Endangered Species Act. 
The accompanying brief details the foregoing con-
siderations and urges this Court to reverse the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals. In that regard, Pacific 
Legal Foundation brings to this case a perspective 
not presently represented. Petitioner represents the 
important but restrictive perspective of a govern-
mental entity charged with completing the Tellico 
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Dam. Respondents bring the perspective of citizens 
opposed to a particular federal project. Pacific Legal 
Foundation represents a broader and different public 
interest which is concerned that the Endangered 
Species Act be implemented nationally in the manner 
contemplated by Congress. Participation by Pacific 
Legal Foundation in this case will assist in obtaining 
fuller consideration of the public interest issues. 
Accordingly, Pacific Legal Foundation respectfully 
requests leave to file the annexed brief amicus curiae. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD A. ZUMBRUN 
RAYMOND M. MOMBOISSE 
ROBERT K. BEST 
PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION 
455 Capitol Mall 
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Pacific Legal Foundation 
INDEX 
Page 
INTEREST OF AMICUS ............................... 1 
INTRODUCTION ..................................... 1 
BACKGROUND ...................................... 2 
ARGUMENT ....................................... 3 
I. Congress, With Full Knowledge Of The Impact 
On The Snail Darter, Declared Its Intent That 
The Tellico Dam Project Be Completed. 
II. The Endangered Species Act Does Not StriR-
The Court Of Its Inherent Eguitable PQw.er To 
TIe ermine Whether Or Not It Is In The Public 
Interest To Grant Equitable Relief. 
III. The District Court Properly Balanced The 
Equities In Refusing To Enjoin Completion 
And Operation Of The Tellico Project. 
CONCLUSION ...................................... 12 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES: 
Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc. v. 
Train, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated on 
other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975) ............. 7 
Dorfman v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1969) .... 9 
Environment.al Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.) aff'd, 468 
F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972) ..................... 2 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) aff'd, 
492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974) ................... 2 
Greene County Planning Board v. F.P.C., 455 F.2d 412 
(2d Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972) ....... 7 
Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944) ................ 6,7 
Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 419 F. Supp. 753 
(E.D. Tenn. 1976) ........................... 2, 3,9 
ii Table of Authorities Continued 
Page 
Hill v. Tennessee, Valley Authority, 549 F .2d 1064 (6th 
Cir. 1977) ............ .. . .... . ... . .......... 2,8, 10 
Porter v. Warner Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946) ... ... ... 7 
Train v. Colorado Pub . Int. Research Group, 426 U.S. 
1 (1976) .. . . . .... ........... ... . ... .... .. .... 11 
Truly v. Wanzer, 46 U.S. 141 (1847) ... .... . .... ... 6 
United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 
534 (1940) National Wildlife Ilederation v. Cole-
man, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976) .............. 10 
United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554 (1940) ...... 5 
United States v. Mitchell, 109 U.S. 148 (1893) ...... . . 4 
United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940) 6 
STATUTES: 
The Endangered Special Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531, et seq. 
(Supp. V 1974) ........ . ............. ......... 3 
16 U.S.C. 1536 ............................... 11 
16 U.S.C. 1538 ....... .. ...................... 11 
16 U.S.C. 1540(4) ..... .. . ........ ..... ....... 5 
16 U.S.C. 1540(c) .... .... ... ......... . ... . .... 5 
16 U.S.C. 1540(e) (2) .......................... 5 
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 
et. seq. (1970 and Supp V 1975) ................ 7 
MISCELLANEOUS: 
1973 U.s. Code Congo and Ad. News, 2989, 2991 5 
H.R. Rep. No . 319, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1975) ... 4 
S. Rep. No. 960, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1976) ...... 4 
Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power De-
velopment and Energy Research Appropriation 
Bill, 1976, before a Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. Pt. 4, 3776 (1975) ... . .. . ................. 8 
Table of Authorities Continued III 
Page 
Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power De-
velopment and Energy Research Appropriation 
Bill, 1977, before a Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. Pt. 4, 3096-3099 and Pt. 5, 260-262 (1977) .. 8 
K. M. Schreiner, A Word About the Technical Bulletin; 
Endangered Special Tech. Bl., Vol. I, No.1, USDI, 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (July, 1976) ..... 10 
IN THE 
~uprrutr ([nurt nf t4r llluitr~ ~tutr!i 
No. 76-1701 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, Petitioner, 
v. 
HIRAM G. HILL, JR., ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER, DONALD 
S. COHEN, THE AUDUBON COUNCIL OF TENNESSEE, 
INC., THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEASTERN BIOLOGISTS, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE PACIFIC LEGAL 
FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 
INTEREST OF AMICUS 
Pacific Legal Foundation is a non-profit, tax exempt 
corporation engaging in litigation in matters affecting 
the public interest. The Foundation has as a principal 
concern the development of environmental law within 
the framework of a healthy and growing national 
economy. The background and interest of the amicus 
is detailed in the preceding motion for leave to file 
this brief. 
INTRODUCTION 
There are those who would portray the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA) as an uncaring giant pitting 
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its might against a helpless three inch fish. The District 
Court found otherwise: 
TV A has made a good faith effort to conserve the 
snail darter and has consulted with other agencies 
about the problem rather than taking the im-
mutable position that it was not required to 
comply with the Act. Hill v. Tennessee VaUe11 Au-
thority, 419 F. Supp. 753, 763 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) . 
While the Court of Appeals agreed with the District 
Court on this point/ it interprets the Endangered 
Species Act in a mechanical and inflexible manner. As 
a result, it is TVA that is helpless and reduced to im-
potence while a three inch fish is permitted to control 
the destiny and resources of millions of people. In 
short, the Act that was intended as a shield has become 
a sword in the hands of those who, for whatever rea-
son, oppose projects developed pursuant to proper 
exercise of administrative or legislative authority. 
BACKGROUND 
The Tellico Dam, which was begun in March of 
1967, is essentially completed and ready for operation.2 
This project was built in full compliance with the 
applicable environmental statutes and has withstood 
the tests of unrelenting environmental challenge. 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1972) aff'd, 
468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972) ; Environmental Defense 
Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 371 F . Supp. 
1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) aff'd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 
1974) . 
1 Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 549 F.2d 1064, 1974 (6th 
Cir. 1977). 
2 Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 419 F. Supp. at 759. 
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In 1973 the snail darter was discovered in an area 
to be impounded by a reservoir. Shortly after the 
species was discovered the Endangered Species Act 
was enacted. 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq. (Supp. V 1974). 
Respondents in this case petitioned the Secretary of 
the Interior to place the snail darter upon the Endan-
gered Species List. By April of 1976 the darter was on 
the list and the area at the base of the Tellico Dam 
was designated "critical habitat." 
In February of 1976 respondents filed the instant 
action which is the third attempt to block the construc-
tion of this project. The District Court found that the 
Tellico Dam Project was essentially completed and that 
no alternatives were available "short of scrapping the 
entire project." Hill, 419 F. Supp. at 758. Scrapping 
the Tellico Project will have an enormous impact upon 
the region which is characterized by unemployment, 
low income, and youth migration. The District Court 
further found that the public treasury would suffer an 
immediate loss of 53 million dollars in nonrecoverable 
obligations. I d. at 760. In spite of these findings the 
Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and en-
joined construction of the dam. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Congress. With Full Knowledge Of The Impact On The Snail 
Darter. Declared Its Intent Thai The Tellico Dam Project 
Be Completed 
Prior to the placing of the snail darter on the En-
dangered Species List, TVA informed both House and 
Senate Committees of the existence, status, and habitat 
of the snail darter and of efforts of TVA to preserve 
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the darter. In recommending for appropriations the 
House Committee stated: 
The Committee directs that the project, for which 
an environmental impact statement has been 
completed and provided the Committee, should be 
completed as promptly as possible . for energy 
supply and flood protection in the public interest. 
[H.R. Rep.N o. 319, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 
(1975)]. 
With full knowledge of the snail darter Congress ap-
propriated over 29 million dollars and the President 
signed the appropriations into law. 
Approximately a year later, after the snail darter 
was classified as an endangered species, officials of TVA 
fully explained to Congress all the options now before 
Congress and the public. In unmistakable language the 
Senate Committee stated : 
The Committee does not view the Endangered 
Species Act as prohibiting the completion of the 
Tellico project at its advanced stage and directs 
that this project be completed as promptly as 
possible in the public interest. [So Rep. No. 960, 
94th Congo 2d Sess. 96 (1976)]. 
Congress once again appropriated monies for the Tel-
lico project. The bill was signed by the President. 
Congress can, through appropriation acts, suspend 
the operation of another statute. "The whole question 
depends on the intention of Congress as expressed." 
United States v. Mitchell~ 109 U.S. 148, 153 (1893). Con-
gres can express its intent through simple failure to 
appropriate monies or expressly, as in Mitchell. There 
is, however, "no doubt that Congress could suspend or 
repeal" the authorizatIon of a statute by an amend-
5 
ment to an appropriations bill. United States v. Dick-
erson~ 310 U.S. 554, 555 (1940). 
It is clear Congress thought the Endangered Species 
Act did not bar completion of the Tellico Dam. The 
plain language of Committee reports 3 and congres-
sionally approved appropriations indicate an unambi-
guous congressional intent to complete the Tellico 
Project. 
fi. 
~ '/ 
The Endangered Species Act Does Not Strip The Court Of Its 
Inherent Equitable Power To Determine Whether Or Not It Is In 
The Public Interest To Grant Equitable Relief 
Section 11 of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1540 ( c), grants the district courts jurisdiction over 
any actions arising under the Act. The enforcement ,I 
powers granted these courts are permissive: 
The judges of the district courts of the United . 
States and the United States magistrates may~ I 
within their respective jurisdictions, upon proper I 
oath or affirmation showing probable cause, issue ) 
such warrants or other process as may be required 
for enforcement of this chapter and any regula-
tion issued thereunder ... 16 U.S.C. § 1540( e) (2). 
This is to be compared with other sections of the Act 
in which enforcement powers are mandatory/ While 
the grant of jurisdiction and power to the district i 
court includes the power to grant injunctions, there is \ 
no change in the standards for granting injunctions, \\ 
31973 U.S. Code Congo and Adm. News, 2989, 2991. These reports 
show that the Secretary of Interior is provided with discretion to \ 
list and de-list animals and to create efficient management programs. i 
• E.g. Mandatory Forfeiture, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(4). 
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and no elimination of the power of the court to with-
hold injunctive relief after a balancing of equities. Of 
course, the application of this balancing approach re-
J' quires that the party sought to be enjoined co~es with I clean hands to request a ba~ancing of the eqmtIes. See United States v. San Franmsco, 310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940). Generally, injunctive relief is to be sparingly granted. 
This Court has stated: 
There is no power, the exercise of ~hich is. more 
delicate, which requires greater cautIOn, dehb~ra­
tion, and sound discretion, or more d~n.ger01~s lD a 
doubtful case than the issuing of an lDJunctIon. It 
is the strong ~rm of equity, that never ought to be 
extended unless to cases of great injury .... Truly 
v. Wanz~r, 46 U.S. 141, 142 (1847). . 
The mere grant of jurisdiction under the Endangered 
Species Act did not require ~he District. Court to en-
join the Tellico Project. ThIs Court reJected such a 
mechanical approach in Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 
(1944). 
\ I In Hecht, the government urged that once. it ,:as V established that the defendant engaged in actsv~ol~tIve 
of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, IDJunc-
\ 
tive relief was available as of right. 321 U.S. at 322. 
Here the Court stated: 
But we do not think that under all circumstances 
the Court must issue the injunction or other order 
which the administrator seeks. 
A grant of jurisdiction to issue compliance orders 
hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under 
any and all circumstances. 321 U.S. at 328, 329. 
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In analyzing the equity jurisdiction of a district court 
confronted with a statute specifically providing injunc-
tive relief, this Court noted that the "historic injunc-
tive process was designed to deter, not to punish." 321 
U.S. at 329. 
Flexibility, rather than rigidity, has distinguished 
injunctive relief. Mercy, practicability, adjustment, 
public interest, good faith, and difficulties of compli-
ance are unique considerations of injunctive relief. In a 
later decision this Court reaffirmed the balancing of 
equities approach and took special note of public in-
terest cases: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, all the in-
herent equitable powers of the District Court are 
available for the proper and complete exercise of 
that jurisdiction. And since the public interest is 
involved in a proceeding of this naturre, those 
equitable powers assume an even broader and more 
flexible character than when only a private con-
troversy is at stake. Porter v. Warner Co., 328 'J 
U.S. 395, 398 (1946). [Emphasis added]. 
More recently, in cases involving the retroactive ap-
plication of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEP A), 42 U.S.C. § 4221 et seq., courts have followed 
the same balancing of the equities approach. See Con-
servation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc. v. Train, 
508 F.2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 
423 U.S. 809 (1975); Greene County Planning Bd. v. 
FPC, 455 F.2d 412-25 (2nd Cir.) cert denied, 409 U.S. 
842 (1972). 
In stark contrast to the traditional equities approach 
applied by the District Court, the Court of Appeals, in 
the instant case, found that once a violation of the Act 
existed, an inj unction must be issued. The Court of 
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Appeals simply stated that the "District Court abused 
its discretion when it refused to enjoin a clear viola-
tion of federal law. " 549 F.2d at 1074. 
Consideration of the equities in this case shows the 
harsh results inherent in the Court of Appeals' ap-
proach. 
III. 
The District Court Properly Balanced The Equities In Refusing To 
Enjoin Completion And Operation Of The Tellico Project 
In denying respondents' request for injunctive re-
lief the District Court properly considered the public , . 
benefits associated with the Tellico proJect. Construc-
tion of the Tellico Dam project, initiated in 1967, is 
essentially complete. Over 105 million dollars have been 
spent of the approximately 116 million specifically al-
located for the project. The District Court found that 
there will be a 53 million dollar unreimbursed loss if 
the project is enjoined. If the respondents succe~d, t?e 
project will stand completed but unuse~. The DIstrIct 
, Court found that there is no alternatlve other than 
abandoning this completed project. 
In addition to this initial economic loss, energy pro-
duction flood control employment opportunities and 
recreation benefits will also be lost. If the project is 
enjoined, as respondents desire/ the public as a whole 
5 Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power Development 
and Energy Research Appropriation Bill, 1?7~ before a Subcom~ 
mittee of the House Committee on Appropnatwns, 94th Oong. 1st 
Sess. Pt. 4, 3776 (1975 ) ; See also Hearings on Public Works f?r 
Water and Power Development and Energy Research Approprta-
tion Bill, 1977 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Appropriations, 94th Oong., 2d Sess. Pt. 4, p. 3096-3099; and Pt. 5, 
p. 260-262 (1977). 
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will be irreparably harmed through loss of these addi-
tional benefits which would have enhanced the quality 
of life. 
The District Court, in refusing to enjoin completion 
of the Tellico Dam, applied the traditional principal of 
equity that an injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, 
"should be sparingly exercised" in cases clearly war-
ranting such relief. Dorfman v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168, 
1173 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In determining whether the ap-
plicants had met their burden, the District Court an-
alyzed the facts, carefully weighed the requirements 
of injunctive relief, and construed the Endangered 
Species Act in a manner consistent with its legislative 
purpose and history. After looking at these equitable 
factors this court stated: 
At some point in time a federal project becomes 
so near completion and so incapable of modifieation 
that a court of equity should not apply a statute 
enacted long after inception of the project to pro-
duce an unreasonable result. 419 F. Supp. at 760. 
In considering the likelihood of injury to respond-
ents the District Court found TVA had taken every 
possible step short of abandoning the completed project 
to preserve the snail darter. It was TVA that trans-
planted the darter and spent monies on research, even 
prior to the listing of the darter. In terms of injury to 
the fish, it was and is TVA that acted to minimize harm. 
The injury to the respondent is speculative, at best, 
and only the result of excessively rigid statutory con-
struction. The Court of Appeals improperly construed 
the language of the Endangered Species Act and there-
by eliminated the district court's traditional powers of 
equitable discretion. 
1 
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The Endangered Species Act could not have been 
conceived as a program to freeze the number of species 
on earth; that number probably exceeds two million 
with new species being constantly identified.s The num-
ber of species which have passed out of existence in the 
earth's history is staggering. Congress did not legislate 
a biological impossibility, and to so interpret the En-
dangered Species Act creates an unworkable statute 
under which opponents of any particular human en-
deavor can seek out obscure and heretofore unknown 
species of insect, fish, mollusk, and plant for the pur-
pose of ceaseless legal challenges. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals adopted an in-
flexible construction of the Act which ignores the bene-
fits and equities, despite legislative history to the con-
trary, stating: "The meaning and spirit of the Act are 
clear on its face. We need not refer to legislative his-
story to rationalize our independent assessment of its 
impact." 549 F.2d at 1072. In discussing the District 
Court's example of the worst case possible in which a 
100% completed project is found to impact on an en-
dangered species the day before it is to become opera-
tional, the Court of Appeals stated: "Conscientious 
enforcement of the Act requires that it be taken to its 
logical extreme." 549 F.2d at 1071. This plain meaning 
doctrine relied upon by the Court of Appeals is inap-
propriate. For, where the "plain meaning" has "led 
to absurd or futile results . . . this Court has looked 
beyond the words to the purpose of this Act." United 
States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 541 
6 K. M. Schreiner, A Word About the Technical Bulletin; En-
dangered Species Tech. Bl., Vol. I, No.1, USDI, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (.July, 1976). 
11 
(1940) ; see also Train v. Colorado Pub. Int. Research 
Group, 426 U.S. 1 (1976). 
As noted previously, the courts below recognized the 
good faith efforts by TVA to save the snail darter. 
Further, there has been no finding of a violation of the 
prohibited acts delineated in Section 9 of the Act, 16 
~.S.C: § 1538. Instead, the Court of Appeals found a 
vIOlatIOn of Section 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536, despite the fact 
that this section only creates a process for "interagency J 
cooperation" and for "consultation." The Act and its 
h~st~ry evidence concern to prevent extinction of species 
wIthm the context of creating effective management 
pro.grams. It was not designed as a means to preclude 
a.chon by other agencies in fulfillment of their legisla-
tIve responsibilities. 
In ignoring the unique factual circumstances pre-
sented in this case, the Court of Appeals produced the 
ex~reme and harsh result of enjoining a highly bene-
fiCIal.project which is essentially complete. Congress, in 
enactmg the Endangered Species Act, did not intend 
that the law be construed in such a restrictive manner. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Pacific Legal Foun-
dation urges the Court to reverse the Court of Ap-
peals and to reinstate the opinion of the District 
Court which accurately expresses the public policy 
as expressed by Congress. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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